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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COURTS-MARTIAL-POWER OF CONGRESS

TO PROVIDE FOR MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS-During
the past term the Supreme Court decided three cases involving
the constitutionality of court-martial jurisdiction over certain
groups of civilians.1 In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles2 the
Court held that Congress could not constitutionally provide for
military trial of a discharged serviceman for offenses committed
during his term of service. In two subsequent cases3 the Court rejected the contention that the Toth decision announced a principle
applicable to any exercise of jurisdiction over civilians by the
military courts in upholding the provisions of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice4 for military jurisdiction over civilian dependents accompanying American servicemen abroad. This comment
attempts to ascertain the principles upon which these decisions

1 Previous decisions of the Court had not spelled out the constitutional limits with
any degree of definiteness, and the lower court decisions were not at all uniform. In Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 at 46, 63 S.Ct. 1 (1942), the Court specifically reserved the con•
sideration of the limits of the jurisdiction of military tribunals. On the very point in•
volved in the Toth decision there was a definite split of authority which had aroused
considerable controversy. Compare Terry v. United States, (D.C. Wash. 1933) 2 F. Supp.
962, with United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, (D.C. N.Y. 1946) 69 F.
Supp. 661, reversed in unreported order of 2d Cir., No. 20235, April 18, 1946. See WIN·
THROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 104 (1920).
2 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1 (1955).
3 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 76 S.Ct. 886 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487,
76 S.Ct. 880 (1956).
4 64 Stat. L. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) c. 22 (referred to in succeeding references as
Uniform Code).
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were based, and to determine their effect on present and potential
provisions for military jurisdiction.

I
The need for some provision for the trial of servicemen for
crimes committed while in the armed forces, but which were not
discovered until after their discharge, had been recognized for
some time before the passage of the Uniform Code.15 The need
became particularly apparent when the Supreme Court held in
1949 that under the then existing military law, a person in the
service could not be tried for an offense committed during a
previous term of service. 6 This decision was not placed on constitutional grounds, but rather was based on the ground that,
absent a provision by Congress for such trial, jurisdiction could
not be inferred from the existing provisions.7 Under the impression that there was no constitutional issue involved, Congress included such a provision when it passed a complete revision of the
military laws the following year. 8 The provision was made as
narrow as possible to meet the specific need. It provided for courtmartial jurisdiction over an ex-serviceman only for more serious
crimes (punishable by more than five years' imprisonment), and
for offenses for which he was not subject to prosecution in the
federal district courts.9
Toth was honorably discharged from the Air Force and then
arrested five months later to be taken to Korea for trial by a courtmartial for murder and conspiracy to commit murder while serving there.10 In freeing Toth, the Court held that "Congress cannot
subject civilians like Toth to trial by court-martial. They, like
other civilians, are entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article III
of the Constitution. " 11
5 See, generally, Myers and Kaplan, "Crime Without Punishment," 35 GEo. L.J. 303
(1947).
6 United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, 69 S.Ct. 530 (1949), noted in
48 MICH. L. REv. 234 (1949). Note that article 3 (a) of the Uniform Code was made much
broader than this case required. The provision may still be valid to permit the exercise
of jurisdiction if the accused is actually in service, although during a subsequent term,
when the charges are brought.
7 336 U.S. 210 at 215-216, 218.
8 95 CONG. REc. 5721 (1949); 96 CONG. REc. 1367 (1950).
9 Uniform Code, art. 3 (a). See Martin v. Young, (D.C. Cal. 1955) 134 F. Supp. 204.
10 Actual offenses charged were violations of Uniform Code, arts. 118 and 81.
11 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 at 23, 76 S.Ct. I (1955) (emphasis
added).
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Congress' power to legislate in regard to the provision in question is derived, as the Court states, from its authority to "make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces," 12 together with the other more general constitutional provisions relating to the military establishment.13 In the Fifth
Amendment there is a specific exception made for "cases arising in
the land and naval forces," so as to obviate the need for grand jury
indictment and jury trial in such proceedings. Although it is possible to argue that this language was a limitation on the grant of
power in Article I, that is, that the constitutionality of courtmartial jurisdiction would turn on the interpretation of "cases
arising in" the armed forces,1 4 the Court in the Toth case followed
a line of authority which holds that the purpose of the exception
clause was to exempt specifically from the operation of these
amendments whatever provisions Congress might make under its
Article I power for regulation through military court proceedings.15
Both the majority and minority of the Court agreed that the
decision as to the constitutionality of the particular jurisdictional
provision must be based on an interpretation of the proper function of the military tribunal, based as it is on the congressional
power to make rules for the regulation of the armed forces. Both
agreed that its existence is predicated on the need to maintain
discipline among the troops in active service, and that the scope
of its jurisdiction is therefore limited by the end that it serves.
The majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Black,
held that there was not a sufficient connection between the provision under question and the primary function of the court-martial
for it to be upheld. 16 Justices Reed, Minton,, and Burton, dissenting, felt that the Court went beyond its usual function of determin12 U.S. CoNsr., arL I, §8.
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS 16 (1920); ATKISSON, CoNsrrrUTIONAL
SOURCES OF THE LAws OF WAR (1917).
14 This was in fact the controversy in the two lines of lower court authority cited in
note I supra.
15 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 at 14, n. 5, 76 S.Ct. I (1955); Ex
parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866).
16 The majority stresses in this regard that any jurisdiction allowed the military tribunals is an encroachment on that of the Article Ill courts and, more particularly, a
consequent deprivation of the jury trial guaranteed in those courts, and therefore even
the specific grant of authority to Congress to regulate the armed forces must be construed
as narrowly as possible. That a right which is not considered fundamental enough to be
included in Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees in state courts should be the
controlling factor in the denial of military jurisdiction seems difficult to justify. See
discussion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325, 58 S.CL 149 (1937).
13 See
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ing whether or not the means chosen by Congress are reasonably
adapted to the end to be served. In addition to this general
criticism of the basis of the majority opinion, the minority were
willing to uphold the provision even under the strict standard
laid down by the decision. They felt that the majority holding disregarded the fact that a limited provision for just such jurisdiction has been enforced as part of American military law since
1863,17 and pointed out that there are similar provisions for military jurisdiction in most other countries with legal systems similar
to our own.18
II
On the strength of this decision several civilians who had been
convicted by military courts for crimes committed while accompanying the armed forces abroad sought to overturn their convictions, relying on the requirement in the Toth holding that any
exercise of military jurisdiction be necessary to the maintenance
of discipline among the troops in active service. They also cited
the more general language of the court decrying the trial of
civilians as a class by military tribunals since, the Court had
pointed out, even the best of military courts were inherently less
independent than the courts provided for in Article III of the Constitution.19
When confronted with these cases the Court, speaking through
Justice Clark, attempted to clarify the Toth holding. That case,
the Court said, called in question the scope of Congress' power
to deprive a person of his right to grand jury indictment, jury
trial, and the other constitutional safeguards, by the exercise of its
authority to make rules for the regulation of the land and naval
forces. Justice Clark said that since a citizen overseas could not
claim these advantages as a matter of right, there was no question
of whether or not the jurisdiction conferred in the case of dependents was authorized by Congress' military powers. Congress'
power to legislate concerning Americans abroad is derived from
17 Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. L. 696, 697; similar provision re-enacted Art. of War
60, R.S. §1342 (1878); Art. of War 94 (1920), 41 Stat. L. 805; Art. of War 94 (1948), 62
Stat. L. 640; Articles for the Government of the Navy, Art. 14, (Eleventh), R.S. §1624
(1878).
18 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 at 29, n. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1 (1955).
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65 at 78 (1857), defines Congress' power in terms of
the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations.
19 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 at 17, 76 S.Ct. 1 (1955).
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its authority in foreign affairs and its control of United States
citizens, independent of any authority to regulate the armed
forces. 20 Outside the territorial limits of the United States any
particular grant of jurisdiction to the military courts is subject
to attack on constitutional grounds only if it is wholly unreasonable in view of all the circumstances.21
The Court rested its holding in the Krueger and Covert cases
on its earlier decision in In re Ross.,22 which approved the exercise
by a consular court in Japan of criminal jurisdiction over an
American citizen without the procedural safeguards required in
Article III courts. This decision, together with a long line of
cases upholding Congress' plenary power to legislate regarding
American overseas possessions,23 led the Court to the conclusion
that persons situated as the military dependents were may be
tried in legislative courts established by Congress.24 In the Court's
approval of the jurisdictional provision in question particular
stress was placed upon the relation of the petitioners to the operation of the military establishment, the very criterion which had
been suggested by the Toth decision. The investigation in the
Krueger case, however, was not for the purpose of determining
whether the jurisdiction was properly provided for in pursuance
of Congress' power to regulate the military establishment, but
rather whether the connection between the petitioners and the
operations of the military was sufficient to reject any contention
that the use of the military tribunal was arbitrary or capricious.
That this connection was a significant factor in the present holding
is emphasized by the Court's extended discussion of the nature
and scope of our overseas military operations.215 The Court said
that it was not passing on the power of Congress to provide for
similar trials for Americans sojourning, touring, or temporarily
residing abroad, not on the constitutional limitations on the juris20 See, generally, discussion of cases in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 at 73, 61 S.Ct.
924 (1941). See, generally, CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 308, 309, 277-279
(1952). It was this general power of Congress, and no special power obtained by treaty,
which was involved, as pointed out by the Court. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 at 480,
76 S.Ct. 886 (1956).
21 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 at 476 ff., 76 S.Ct. 886 (1956).
22 140 U.S. 453 at 464, 11 S.Ct. 897 (1891). See, generally, CORWIN, CoNSTITIITION OF
THE UNITED STATES 877 (1952). Cf. Neely v •. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 21 S.Ct. 302 (1901);
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 72 S.Ct. 699 (1952). See, generally, Fairman, "Some New
Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag," 1 STAN. L. R.Ev. 587 (1949).
23 See cases cited in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 at 474, 475, 76 S.Ct. 886 (1956).
24 Id. at 476.
25 Id. at 477, n. 7.
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diction of military courts sitting in this country.26 While the Court
approved the Ross holding in principle, it was not willing to go beyond the situations actually before it in the Krueger and Covert
cases, in which there was a very close connection between the persons involved and the military establishment, in approving the use
by Congress of the military courts to try civilians for overseas
offenses.

III
The three decisions taken together lay down skeleton rules
by which the constitutionality of the present jurisdictional provisions of the uniform code may be tested. They say that Congress
can confer jurisdiction on military courts in derogation of a person's right to the kind of trial he would have in the federal courts
only when such jurisdiction is necessary to maintain discipline
among troops in active service. In addition, Congress can use
the military courts as a means of exercising its jurisdiction over
American citizens who are outside the territorial limits of the
United States, perhaps subject to the limitation that the persons
subjected to military jurisdiction have a certain connection with
the operation of the military establishment.
The jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform Code, excluding
the one invalidated in the Toth case, may be classified in two
groups:
(1) Jurisdiction based on present or former membership in
the armed forces:
(a) All members of a regular component of the armed
forces;
(b) Personnel of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Public
Health Service, or other organization assigned to or
serving with the armed forces;
(c) Cadets and midshipmen;
(d) Reserve personnel on inactive duty trammg, if
under written orders voluntarily accepted by them
specifying that they are so subject;
(e) Members of Fleet and Fleet Marine Reserves;
(f) Persons serving court-martial sentences in military
custody;
(g) Prisoners of war in military custody;
26 Id.

at 480.
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(h) Retired reserve personnel receiving armed forces
hospitalization;
(i) Retired regular personnel entitled to receive pay;
G) Persons who have terminated their service status illegally:
(1) Deserters from the armed forces;
(2) Persons charged with having procured their
discharge fraudulently.
(2) Jurisdiction over certain groups of civilians because of
association with, or proximity to, the armed forces:
(a) In wartime, all persons serving with or accompanying the armed forces in the field;
(b) In war or peacetime outside the United States,
Alaska, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, and Hawaiian
and Virgin Islands, all persons who are serving with,
employed by, or accompanying the armed forces, or
who are within an area under control of a Secretary
of the Defense Department.27
Since the code is applicable in all places,28 it is not the locus
of the offense, but the status of the person as set out above which
is the controlling element of military jurisdiction. Except for
certain breaches of military discipline which can only be committed
by military personnel, all of the above persons are subject to
prosecution for all non-capital crimes and offenses for which they
would be triable in a federal court29 in addition to an exhaustive
list of specified offenses, including all the more serious crimes.80
The Court has given no indication that it would limit courtmartial jurisdiction by a denial of the right to try certain offenses,
so the present consideration must be whether or not jurisdiction
27 Uniform Code, arts. 2, 3. These provisions are in addition to art. 3 (a) involved in
the Toth case. An additional provision, Uniform Code, art. 4, provides for a post-dismissal
court-martial hearing on application of an officer, but this is not basically a criminal
jurisdiction. See Wallace v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 396, affd. 257 U.S. 541, 42 S.Ct. 221
(1922). In addition to these more common provisions, the code provides that all persons
shall be subject to court-martial jurisdiction for the commission of certain offenses: (1)
aiding the enemy (art. 104); (2) spying in time of war (art. 106); (3) contempt of court•
martial (art. 48). These provisions appear fully justified as an exercise of the war power,
and of ordinary contempt powers.
Article 18 also includes a general provision for court-martial trial of all persons who
are subject thereto by the law of war. Under the present view of the Court, this probably
is no significant aid to extending jurisdiction. But see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 63 S.Ct.
1 (1942).
28 Uniform Code, art. 5.
29 Uniform Code, art. 134. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 383 (1951).
so Uniform Code, arts. 80-132 inclusive. There is thus a duplication as to many offenses
by specific enumeration and by incorporation by reference of the federal criminal code.
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over each particular group of persons is justified by the need to
maintain discipline among the active troops,31 or by Congress'
power to control American citizens overseas.
It seems advisable to determine first whether there are any
provisions which must necessarily fall because of their similarity
to the provision held unconstitutional in the Toth case. The only
provision close enough to be affected necessarily by that decision
is the one for trial of a fraudulent dischargee for his fraud in
securing his discharge and for previously committed crimes. All
connection with the military would have been severed, and he
could be tried just as well for both the fraud and previously committed crimes in a civilian court.32 In all the other jurisdictional
groups there is some present relation to the military, even if it
is only the receipt of retirement pay, so that in these instances any
finding of unconstitutionality must come from an application of
the more general standard suggested by the language of the Toth
holding.
Two of the remaining categories of service-connected jurisdiction would be subject to the same criticism that the Court leveled
against the result in the Toth case. In most instances, offenses
committed by a retired regular army officer or a retired member
of the reserve who is receiving armed forces hospitalization would
be just as competently tried in a civilian court, and such trial
would result in no disruption of any military routine. However,
it is very likely that the military will be even more hesitant to
exercise their potential jurisdiction in such cases now than they
have been in the past, for they have shown that they are sensitive
to popular sentiment and the practical difficulties involved.38
Thus, the Court will probably have no opportunity to pass on
the constitutionality of such provisions except in the rare case
where the connection to military operations was so close as to lead
to an assertion of jurisdiction, and this very fact would make it
difficult for the Court to invalidate the provision.
The remaining service-connected jurisdictional classifications
are generally consistent with a minimum conception of court31 0£ course, whenever the standard of the Toth case is applied to a jurisdictional
category, it must be understood to be applicable only to persons within the territorial
limits of the United States.
32 It is possible to say that since the discharge was voidable, there was still a subsisting
relation to the military, but in any case this provision would fall before the more general
principle of the Toth case requiring an intimate present relation with military operations.
ss The military opposed even the specific grant of jurisdiction in the provision held
invalid in the Toth decision. See 96 CONG. REc. 1294 (1950).
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martial jurisdiction, i.e., a parallel system of courts to provide for
maintaining military discipline by an especially qualified tribunal,
and for punishing criminal offenses where assertion of civilian
jurisdiction and punishment would be inconsistent with the regime under which the persons involved are living. 34 As the Court
itself has said, they belong to a "separate community recognized
by the Constitution."35
The code provision for military jurisdiction over all civilians
serving with or accompanying the armed forces in the field in wartime is hardly open to question, for it is one of the oldest provisions
in our military law.36 It is justified within the United States by
the standard of the Toth case as well as by Congress' extensive
war powers, and without the United States requires an even higher
degree of association with military operations than the provision
upheld in the Krueger decision.
34 l (a) [The numbering is that used in the text, not that of the code.] The problems
arising under this section are generally ones of statutory interpretation, not of constitutional limitation. The general rule is that servicemen are subject to military law from
oath to discharge or separation. See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 64 S.Ct. 737 (1944);
United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, 69 S.Ct. 530 (1949); Hironimus v.
Durant, (4th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 288, cert. den. 335 U.S. 818, 69 S.Ct. 40 (1948).
(b) Such persons are considered part of the branch of the service with which they are
serving during the limited period for which they are attached.
(c) See Hartigan v. United States, 196 U.S. 169, 25 S.Ct. 204 (1905). As with the
previous section, this jurisdiction has given rise to very little litigation in the federal
courts.
(d) These persons are actually troops in active service at the time they are subject
to the code. Congress inserted the special notice provision so as to remove any uncertainty
as to when they were actually so serving.
(e) This is a special category, with no counterpart in the Army or Air Force, to
which regulars may be transferred after long service. [See 52 Stat. L. 1178 (1938), 34
U.S.C. (1952) §854.] Since the language of the section is not limited to those who are on
active or training duty, it is to this extent subject to constitutional attack. This jurisdiction terminates on retirement. SNEDEKER, MILITARY JusnCE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 126
(1953).
(f) This has been specifically upheld by the Court, Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. I,
41 S.Ct. 224 (1920), and was reaffirmed in Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 76 S.Ct. 880 (1956).
(g) This is simply declaratory of international law, and is subject to applicable treaty
provisions. See SNEDEKER, MILITARY JusnCE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 138 (1953).
(j) (1) This provision was prompted by a federal court holding that discharge
from a subsequent term of service insulated the person involved from prosecution for
desertion from a former term. Ex parte Drainer, (D.C. Cal. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 410. The
ordinary deserter is adequately covered under other legislation which extends the person's
period of service by the amount of absent time. 41 Stat. L. 809 (1920), 10 U.S.C. (1952)
§629.
85 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 at 390, 22 S.Ct. 181 (1902).
36 This is derived from the original 1775 code provisions. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw
AND PRECEDENTS 98 (1920). See also 96 CONG. REc. 1294 (1950). This jurisdiction was
upheld in Perlstein v. United States,. (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 167, cert. dismissed 328
U.S. 822, 66 S.Ct. 1358 (1946). It is, in effect, a very extensive grant of power in view of
the interpretation given to the phrase "in the field." See Hines v. Mikell, (4th Cir. 1919)
259 F. 28 at 34, where it was applied to temporary training camp in the United States.
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The Krueger decision appears to give almost unreserved approval to the remaining provisions for jurisdiction over civilians
serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces
abroad, or who are within an overseas area under control of a
Secretary of the Defense Department. The only provision which
might be challenged consistently with the Court's opinion in the
Krueger case would be that conferring jurisdiction over all persons
within certain overseas areas without mention of their relation
to the military. However, since these areas are those under the
control of the Defense Department, a sufficient connection could
well be found to meet the Court's test.
Conclusion

After rendering an opinion in the Toth case which appeared
to undermine several major areas of court-martial jurisdiction, the
Court in the Krueger case limited its earlier decision, and proceeded to reinforce on entirely separate grounds the grants of military
jurisdiction which had been questioned on the authority of the
Toth holding. Justices Reed, Minton, and Burton, who dissented
in the Toth decision, were joined by Justices Clark and Harlan in
reaffirming court-martial jurisdiction over a very large group of
civilians, thus showing clearly that the Toth decision was not to
be taken as indicating a general tendency on the part of the Court
to confine military jurisdiction to the narrowest possible limits.
The extremely far-reaching principle underlying the Kr11,eger
decision, i.e., that an American citizen overseas cannot demand the
same protection there in prosecutions in United States courts for
federal crimes that he can while in this country, was not elaborated
by the Court. It is entirely possible that the Court would in a later
instance stress one of the particular factors of the situation involved
in the Krueger and Covert cases, e.g., the voluntary nature of
military dependents' sojourn abroad, or perhaps the really intimate connection of the persons here involved with the military
establishment, and thereby in effect distinguish these cases and the
earlier consular authority cases upon which they were based. For
example, in a case in which continued employment with the
government depended on accepting these conditions when an
employee was transferred overseas, or if Congress found it expedient to provide for court-martial jurisdiction over all crimes
committed by Americans abroad, the Court might well say that
this was an unconstitutional condition to work or travel abroad.
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This possibility is indicated by the Court's reservation in the
Krueger case of the right to find certain grants of jurisdiction
"arbitrary or capricious."37 This is reinforced by the specific
limitation of the Krueger holding to jurisdiction over military
dependents, although on the surface the opinion appears to affirm
beyond recall a principal of much broader application.
In the Toth case the Court announced a standard which may
be applied to limit grants of court-martial jurisdiction in derogation of the right to trial in an Article III court, or at least indicated its general attitude toward the exercise of Congress' power
to make rules for t4e regulation of the armed services. The
Krueger opinion opened up a wider sphere of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians by affirming on independent grounds a grant
made by Congress supposedly in pursuance of its military authority.
If Congress seeks to exercise the power which the Krueger decision
seems to affirm it possesses, the Court may well be called upon
again to elaborate the principle upon which that decision was
based.
Whitmore Gray, S.Ed.
37 Kinsella

v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 at 478, 76 S.Ct. 886 (1956).

